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F E A T U R E
Montgomery, Crerar and the 
Possibility of Canadian Military 
Independence, 1944
J . L .  G R A N A T S T E I N
Abstract : Bernard Montgomery and Harry Crerar were not friends, and 
their relationship grew worse in September 1944 when Crerar skipped 
a meeting at Montgomery’s headquarters to attend a commemorative 
service at Dieppe. A furious Montgomery indicated that he wanted to 
sack Crerar, and the Canadian responded that he would consult his 
government. Monty quickly realized he could not easily get rid of the 
First Canadian Army commander, but Crerar, fuming, asked Canadian 
Military Headquarters to study how to secure more independence for 
his army. The course of the war by late 1944 eventually rendered this 
idea moot, but it was nonetheless an important, if hitherto unnoticed 
moment, in Canada’s military history.
Bernard montgomery and harry crerar were never close. The British military hero, the Commander in Chief of 21st 
Army Group, and the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of First 
Canadian Army from March 1944 clashed in the field almost from the 
moment the Canadian’s headquarters went operational in Normandy 
on 23 July 1944. Though Montgomery had seemed to approve of 
Crerar in training exercises in England, he had formed a distinctly 
negative view of him in Italy where Crerar briefly commanded I 
Canadian Corps. To Montgomery, the only Canadian officer capable 
of higher command was Guy Simonds. Crerar and Simonds, late 
in 1943 commanding the 5th Canadian Armoured Division in Italy, 
sparred bitterly; so much so that Crerar thought his subordinate 
mentally ill and told Montgomery so. That did not sit well with the 
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2 Montgomery, Crerar and Canadian Military Independence
then-commander of the Eighth Army who recognised a battle of egos 
when he saw one.1
By the time Crerar had been in Normandy for a month, 
Montgomery was unhappy with what he perceived as the lack of 
drive in Crerar’s conduct of operations. The Field Marshal concluded 
that Simonds, then leading II Canadian Corps in the vicious fighting 
south of Caen, ought to be commanding First Canadian Army.
For Montgomery, the breaking point with Crerar came on 3 
September. He summoned the Canadian to an important meeting at 
his Tactical Headquarters to discuss his plans for Operation Market 
Garden, the airborne and ground assault that aimed to secure key 
bridges over the Rhine. Attending were the senior commanders of 
1  The Crerar-Simonds spat involved Crerar sending an officer to take measurements 
of Simonds’ caravan without the latter’s permission. This infuriated Simonds and 
led to sharp exchanges. See J.L. Granatstein, The Generals: The Canadian Army’s 
Senior Commanders in the Second World War (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), 161-62.
Simonds, Montgomery and Crerar in February 1945. [LAC 4002428]
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21st Army Group, 12th US Army Group and the First US Army. 
Apparently under the impression—the wrong impression—that the 
meeting was not immediately important, Crerar opted instead to 
attend the commemorative service at Dieppe, the site of the August 
1942 debacle that had wiped out much of 2nd Canadian Division’s 
infantry. Crerar claimed that he had not received a message stating 
that it was “essential” he attend Monty’s briefing, blaming signals 
problems. This was untrue; the message had been received but 
Crerar had requested that it not be passed to him.2 As a result, the 
eventual meeting between the Field Marshal and the General later 
that day was extremely testy, with Monty chewing out Crerar and 
declaring that their “ways must part.” Crerar protested that he had 
good reason—indeed 800 reasons, the number of Canadian dead at 
Dieppe—to miss the meeting.3
Montgomery was furious nonetheless. He “intimated that he was 
not interested in my explanation,” Crerar wrote the next day to 
General Kenneth Stuart, the Chief of Staff at Canadian Military 
Headquarters (CMHQ) in England. “[T]he Canadian aspect of the 
Dieppe ceremonial was of no importance compared to getting on with 
the war.” Montgomery inferred that he would get Crerar replaced, 
but the Canadian, standing on his rights as a national commander, 
replied “that I assumed he would at once take this up through higher 
channels and that, I, in turn, would at once report the situation to 
my Government.”4 
The thought that he might become embroiled in a dispute with 
Ottawa apparently led Montgomery to back off. On 7 September, the 
Field Marshal, pressed by Lieutenant-Colonel (Lt.-Col.) Trumball 
Warren, his Canadian personal assistant, apologised to Crerar: “I 
am sorry I was a bit rude the other day, and somewhat outspoken. I 
was annoyed that no one [from First Canadian Army] came to a very 
2  Paul Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General: A Biography of General H.D.G. 
Crerar (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 330. Dickson’s is the best 
account of this incident.
3  Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General, 333.
4  As quoted in C.P. Stacey, The Victory Campaign, Vol. III: The Operations in 
North-West Europe (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1960), 305; and J.L. Granatstein, 
The Best Little Army in the World: The Canadians in Northwest Europe (Toronto: 
Harper Perennial, 2015), 132-33.
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important conference. But forget about it—and let us get on with the 
war. It was my fault.”5 
Neither man would forget about it, however. Long after the war, 
Montgomery wrote to Warren that Crerar had been unfit to command 
an army: “What I suffered from that man!”6 The Field Marshal, 
as one of his staff officers later observed, “was astonishing in his 
relationship with all the Dominion troops. He ordered them around 
like British troops, ignoring the devolution of the British Empire…he 
was completely out of date.”7 
Crerar, however, was never out of date in his understanding of the 
constitutional niceties. He and Stuart had raised the constitutional 
and legal issues with Montgomery before and after D-Day, arguing 
strenuously that Crerar “was bound to be responsible to the Canadian 
Government, in the last resort, for the operational employment of all 
Canadian troops in 21 Army Group.” Montgomery on 19 June had 
indicated that he understood, professing satisfaction that the “air was 
properly cleared.”8 
Crerar was an emotional man with a fierce temper that he 
struggled to control and he was as unhappy with Montgomery as 
Monty was with him. He left his 3 September meeting with the Field 
Marshal in a rage. “I’ve never seen a chap so mad,” Lt.-Col. Warren 
recalled when Crerar left Monty’s caravan. “That guy is not going to 
get away with that,” Crerar fumed.9 
The most nationalistic of Canadian commanders was not Harry 
Crerar. That accolade belonged to General Andrew McNaughton, 
who had led Canadian troops in England from 1939 until late 1943, 
when he was removed from command of First Canadian Army. To 
McNaughton, who had watched General Sir Arthur Currie sometimes 
wrestle with his military superiors about control of the Canadian 
Corps, “the acid test of sovereignty,” he told then Major Charles 
5  As quoted in Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General, 335.
6  As quoted in Granatstein, Best Little Army, 135.
7  As quoted in Granatstein, The Generals, 109.
8  As quoted in Granatstein, The Generals, 109. Montgomery on 18 May 1944 talked 
with Prime Minister Mackenzie King about his views on the legalities surrounding 
command of Canadian troops in the field. See, W.L.M. King Diary, f. 502ff, Library 
and Archives Canada.
9  As quoted in Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General, 335. See also the Trumball 
Warren interview in J.L. Granatstein, The Weight of Command: Voices of Canada’s 
Second World War Generals and Those Who Knew Them (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 2016), 209-12.
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Stacey at their first meeting in January 1941, “is the control of the 
armed forces.”10 The British resented this attitude, clearly feeling 
that the war often came second to McNaughton’s insistence on the 
niceties of Canadian sovereignty. General Sir Alan Brooke, the Chief 
of the Imperial General Staff (and in the Great War a staff officer 
at the Canadian Corps headquarters), wrote in his diary in 1941 
that McNaughton “loved to surround the employment of his Corps 
with a network of ‘Convention,’ ‘Charters,’ and ‘Constitution’ which 
would have rendered the employment of Canadian troops even more 
difficult than that of Allies.”11
Crerar was somewhat less punctilious than McNaughton, but he 
was just as much a stickler on the legalities of his and his nation’s 
position and very conscious of his duties as the Senior Combatant 
Officer, responsible to the government of Canada for his men. He was 
also concerned with his own position, naturally enough, worried that 
Montgomery’s complaints could have resulted in his removal. It was 
not out of character for Crerar, a tough man when he had to be, to 
turn a threat to his command of the Army into a constitutional issue. 
And he did so when he wrote on 5 September to Stuart to urge that 
action should be taken to alter the position of Canadian troops from 
“in combination” with British forces to “serving together.” As defined 
by the Visiting Forces Acts (British Commonwealth) of 1933, troops 
serving together were effectively independent. Troops in combination, 
however, were under unified command and in Northwest Europe for 
the First Canadian Army that meant British command.12 
Aware of the importance of the 1933 Act and of his right to consult 
his government, as Montgomery should have been, Crerar seized on 
this at the meeting on 3 September. Montgomery soon retreated 
from his threat to get Crerar sacked. But only if the Canadians 
were “serving together” with the British, as Crerar apparently 
desired, could First Canadian Army secure an appropriate degree of 
independence, enough to secure some freedom of action.13 
10  As quoted in C.P. Stacey, “Canadian Leaders of the Second World War,” Canadian 
Historical Review 66, 1 (March 1985): 67.
11  As quoted in Granatstein, The Generals, 67.
12  C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada 1939-45 
(Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1970), 210-13.
13  Based on a message from Crerar to Stuart, 5 September 1944, quoted in Dickson, 
A Thoroughly Canadian General, 335.
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Serving under General Stuart at CMHQ was the Judge Advocate 
General (JAG), Major-General Price Montague, a distinguished 
Winnipeg jurist and militia officer soon to replace Stuart as Chief of 
Staff at CMHQ in the rank of lieutenant-general. On his JAG staff 
was Lt.-Col. George Tritschler, another prominent Winnipeg lawyer 
and infantryman who had served in Italy and at First Canadian 
Army headquarters.14 
Many years after the war, Tritschler borrowed Charles Stacey’s 
masterful official history Arms, Men and Governments from his 
friend Major-General Elliott Rodger who had been Simonds’ Chief of 
Staff at II Canadian Corps and Tritschler returned the book with a 
brief hand-written note:
I wonder if Stacey was aware of Crearar’s [sic] proposal to have ‘his’ 
army freed from 21 Army Group and to enjoy the same autonomy which 
the Yanks had from Monty. This was before the Ardennes crisis [the 
German surprise attack in mid-December 1944] which restored the Field 
Marshal’s prestige and Eisenhower placed the First U.S. Army as well 
as the Ninth under Monty’s command and give him control of all Allied 
ground operations on the Northern Flank of the German penetration. It 
was at this stage that our brains trust felt a little sheepish and I gave 
up the embarrassing file of correspondence.15 
The 21st Army Group ordinarily had only the Canadians and Second 
British Army under command and if Crerar’s desire to free First 
Canadian Army had been pressed, Montgomery would have had very 
little to control.
Crerar had always been a consummate bureaucrat, much more 
adept at winning a war of memoranda than commanding a large army 
in action. Montgomery may have been the master of the battlefield, 
14  “Memorable Manitobans: George Eric Tritschler (1901-1993),” Manitoba 
Historical Society, last edited 1 February 2020. http://www.mhs.mb.ca/docs/people/
tritschler_ge.shtml. Tritschler would become the Chief Justice of the Manitoba 
Court of Appeal from 1962 to 1973.
15  Tritschler to Major-General Elliot Rodger, 8.6.81, attached to General Elliot 
Rodger, letter to author, 12 November 2001. Stacey probably did not see Tritschler’s 
file. In Arms, Men and Governments, he writes: “The right to withdraw forces from 
combination…remained academic and theoretical…never exercised…never needed” 
(Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 222). That was correct, but Crerar seemed 
prepared to press for change. If Stacey had known of Crerar’s instruction to General 
Stuart, he would surely have discussed it.
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but Crerar’s proposal was potentially a kill shot in a bureaucratic war. 
His directive could have threatened Montgomery’s weakened position 
in the alliance’s high command in the early autumn of 1944. There had 
been much harshly negative American military and media comment 
directed at Montgomery’s operations around Caen and in closing the 
trap on the Germans fleeing Normandy in mid-August (much of that 
griping directed at the Canadians’ performance), at the failure of 
Market Garden in late September and at the missed opportunities 
and subsequent delays in opening Antwerp to shipping. If word leaked 
out that the Canadians were now so unhappy with Montgomery that 
they were seeking ways to be liberated from his command, this would 
have had serious repercussions at General Dwight Eisenhower’s 
Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force in France 
and in London at the War Office. 
Still, Crerar’s action in seeking to safeguard his own position 
and secure more autonomy would also have caused the utmost 
consternation in Ottawa. Montgomery was still widely hailed as the 
Commonwealth’s greatest general, an attitude held in Canada and 
within the army, and the wartime Dominion was very pro-British. 
If Montgomery was threatened by Crerar’s nationalism, so too was 
Crerar at risk because of Canadian wartime Anglophilia and the 
political crisis this military and legal spat would certainly have sparked 
in Parliament and the media. Prime Minister Mackenzie King, always 
preferring compromise to conflict, would not have been pleased.
What seems beyond doubt is that Crerar’s troubles with 
Montgomery were extremely stressful and his physical condition 
worsened through that difficult September. His biographer observes 
that “his powers of decision slipped markedly” during this period and 
Crerar knew all too well that Montgomery wanted to replace him 
with Guy Simonds.16 Finally on 26 September, he told Montgomery 
that he was ill with dysentery, anemia and stomach problems and 
needed to go to England for medical assessment and treatment. 
Despite his concerns for his own position and grudgingly aware 
that there was no one else able to replace him, Crerar recommended 
that Simonds become acting General Officer Commanding-in-Chief 
of First Canadian Army. Montgomery quickly agreed, finally—if 
temporarily—securing the commander he wanted for First Canadian 
Army. Simonds would fight a brilliant, gruelling battle to clear the 
16  Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General, 321.
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Scheldt estuary and at last allow merchant ships to reach Antwerp, 
raising him even higher in Montgomery’s eyes. And when Crerar was 
ready to return from England to the Continent in late October, the 
Field Marshal tried to prevent this, though all he could achieve was to 
delay Crerar’s resumption of command to 7 November. Crerar certainly 
knew of Montgomery’s efforts to get rid of him once and for all.17
Nonetheless, Crerar at root was a cautious, sensible man, aware 
that Canada was only a junior partner in a vast coalition. His nation 
was deeply committed to the war, he understood the limitations 
on Canada’s—and his—freedom of action and he did not want to 
disrupt the conduct of the war unless such action was absolutely 
necessary. After his resumption of command, his relations with 
Montgomery became correct but cool and there were no further direct 
confrontations. Crerar, his position now secure, wisely did not press 
his arguments for a change in the legal status of Canadian troops. 
As Colonel Tritschler noted, by the beginning of 1945 events in the 
field seemed to make Crerar’s search for more military independence 
somewhat “embarrassing.” Crerar’s concerns in September for his own 
position must have been obvious and no one at CMHQ seemed to want 
to press efforts for military independence too hard. More than a half-
century later, General Rodger’s comment seems appropriate: “I find 
it hard to believe that ‘they’ were seriously considering having First 
Canadian Army fighting as a third arm of Eisenhower’s command 
instead of the British (mainly) 21 Army Group.”18 
◆     ◆     ◆     ◆
about the author
J.L. Granatstein served in the Canadian Army then taught Canadian 
history for thirty years. He was Director and CEO of the Canadian War 
Museum, and writes on Canadian military history, politics, foreign and defence 
policy, and public policy. Among his many publications are The Generals, 
Canada’s Army, The Oxford Companion to Canadian Military History, and 
The Greatest Victory: Canada’s Hundred Days, 1918.
I am grateful to Tim Cook and Norman Hillmer for their very helpful 
suggestions.
17  Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General, 358-59.
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